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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the financing of professional athletic venues and why certain 
franchises are able to obtain high percentages of overall stadium funding from the 
public.  Existing literature shows the negligible effect of new athletic venues on the local 
economy and per capita income, and therefore the benefits from such a project are 
largely intangible.  I use an ordinary least squares regression and show that the more 
successful a team is the less public funding they tend to receive. I also find that broad city 
statistics do not represent the specific areas that policy makers consider when making 
decisions about spending public money.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 In the last twenty years there has been a large spike in stadium construction for 
professional sports franchises in the United States.  Across the four major professional 
sports leagues (The National Football League, Major League Baseball, National 
Basketball Association, and National Hockey League) eighty-one of the one hundred and 
twelve total organizations have moved into a new stadium since 1994.  Many of the other 
teams who continue to play in outdated stadiums have been developing plans and 
proposals to refurbish or build a new facility in the coming years.  Certainly there is a 
trend towards newer and more aesthetically pleasing facilities, and teams who fail to 
deliver on this front are falling back and leaving potential fans behind. 
One theme that remains at the forefront of stadium construction is technology. 
Technological advancement in recent years has enabled franchises to build faster, 
smarter, and more elaborately than ever before.  Furthermore, cutting edge technology 
within the stadiums allows fans to enjoy themselves in more ways than people could 
when they went to a ballgame twenty years ago.  Levi’s Stadium, which is set to open 
before the start of the 2014-2015 NFL season, is set right in the Silicon Valley and will 
have WiFi capability, Internet Protocol Television, and mobile connectivity1.  These 
amenities among others are what franchises want in order to get their fans excited and 
passionate about their team.  
Additionally, it has become rare for two different franchises to share a facility.  Of 
course, there are examples where this is still the case, yet in general there is a strong trend 
away from sharing and towards a unique venue that displays character, promotes passion, 
                                                          
1
 "Levi's Stadium." Levi's Stadium. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2014. <http://levisstadium.com/>. 
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Table 1 
and inspires confidence.  There is no question that a world class facility will strengthen a 
fan base, but the fact of the matter remains: stadiums are expensive. With recent projects 
costing over $1 billion, it can be very difficult for a franchise owner to secure the funding 
necessary to complete their ideal facility.  Often, the owner and other financiers cannot 
obtain enough private funding to erect a facility of such magnitude, so they must turn to 
the government and in turn the public for financing help. 
In a typical stadium funding situation, a private-public partnership is employed.  
Although there are certain stadiums that are financed one hundred percent publically 
(Turner Field in Atlanta) and others that are funded one hundred percent privately 
(MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford) the vast majority have a split: a certain percentage 
of both private and public funding.  Public funds come in many different forms from both 
local and state governments.  A few of the standard funding sources are laid out in Table 
1.2 
A lot of work has been done on the pecuniary benefits that new stadiums provide 
and the results have been overwhelmingly consistent – the erection of new stadiums does 
not boost local economies or raise per capita income.  
                                                          
2
 "NFL Stadium Funding Information." . Convention Sports and Leisure, n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2014. 
<http://cbsminnesota.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/nfl-funding-summary-12-2-11.pdf>. 
City Sales 
Tax 
Car Rental Tax Utility Tax Land 
Contributions 
Sale of 
Held 
Property 
Interest-Free 
Loan 
County 
Sales Tax 
Food/Beverage 
Tax 
Lottery Funds Public Parking 
Revenue 
Sales Tax 
Rebate 
Capital Fund 
Allocation 
Lodging 
Tax 
Property Tax Ticket/Admission 
Tax 
Grants Income 
Tax Rebate 
Infrastructure 
Improvements 
Excise 
Tax 
Income Tax Parking Tax General 
Contribution 
Operating 
Subsidy 
Utility/Transit 
Allocation 
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However, there are benefits that are not necessarily captured in these results.   
Unfortunately, it is hard to quantify these benefits because there are no units of 
measurement that can be compared to monetary value.  Since policy makers are 
constantly comparing projects, it can be very difficult for people to make the case that a 
city’s money would be better spent on a stadium as opposed to education, for example.  
However, it remains true that out of the eighty-one stadiums that have been constructed 
for major sports teams in the last twenty years, nearly all of them have some percentage 
of public funding. 
In this paper I review current literature on why cities choose to fund stadiums by 
examining the benefits that come about as a result.  These benefits include pecuniary 
benefits and non-pecuniary public good benefits.  An overwhelming amount of literature 
shows that the economic benefits of building new athletic venues are negligible, yet there 
exist benefits that are intangible in nature.  Nonetheless, they are unquantifiable in large 
part and do not explain why cities choose to fund professional athletic venues.  In order 
to gain deeper insight into why cities ultimately choose whether or not to provide 
financing for new venues, I have compiled a data set that includes historical and current 
team success metrics, team value, fan base rankings, city and county statistics, and new 
stadium characteristics.  
In phase one of my study, I examine variation among success factors, team value, 
and fan base rankings in how they effect percentage of public funding.  With this 
regression, we obtain some basic information as to how historical success and recent 
success affect the percentage of financing that government agencies are willing to 
provide.  Additionally, this will help us understand how a supportive and active fan base 
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plays a role in stadium funding.  In phase two, I only include city and county statistics in 
the regression and omit all of the success metrics.  These variables will provide a better 
picture of how city characteristics help determine the amount of public funding in a city 
given certain demographics.  In phase 3 of my analysis I include success, team value, 
strength of fan base, and regional statistics together.  This phase will enlighten us as to 
how the four sets of variables affect each other in the regression results.  Finally, in phase 
four, I add a final set of statistics: stadium characteristics.  Including this data in the 
model will ultimately clarify the extent to which the explanatory variables reveal trends 
in public funding for professional athletic venues.   
  
II. Literature Review 
 
Many studies have been done to analyze the effects of professional sports 
franchises on local economies.  More specifically, there is a large amount of literature 
that discusses implementation of professional athletic stadiums in certain areas and how 
those areas change economically as a result.  Primarily, economists have focused on 
tangible and intangible benefits that new stadiums provide to their communities.  
Unfortunately, these benefits are often hard to calculate and therefore it is difficult to say 
whether or not new stadiums warrant the amount of public funding that they receive.  
 
A. Professional Sports Franchises and Stadiums do not Boost Local Economies 
 
The argument that a new stadium will bring about economic improvement in a 
given area has been used for a long time in hopes to obtain public funding from 
government agencies.  However, very little evidence exists that supports a new stadium’s 
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correlation with economic growth.  According to Dennis Coates (2007), the vast majority 
of literature points to the fact that professional sports and new stadium construction have 
negligible impact on income, taxable sales, employment, and even tax revenue from the 
franchise and facility itself. 3  Of course, certain areas have experienced positive effects 
when a team moves into a new stadium, but these are mostly products of redistribution as 
opposed to innate development according to Coates.  Instead of economic improvement 
on a broad scale, certain areas will suffer while only small pockets improve. 
As Baade and Sanderson (1997) point out, local economies can only grow when 
spending in that area increases.  Though it would seem intuitive that constructing a 
professional athletic venue would increase spending in the immediate area, it turns out 
that such a project ultimately takes spending away from other areas.4  Baade and Dye 
(1990) look into this theme further by analyzing the economic situation of nine different 
cities after they had built a professional football or baseball facility.  What they found 
was that the types of jobs created through such projects had no effect or even reduced per 
capita income. Those jobs pay less than average wages and therefore do not actually 
increase overall income in the area.5 
Research done by Coates and Humphreys (2003) further enhances Baade and 
Dye’s argument and focuses primarily on the groups of people that public funding 
proponents think will benefit from stadium erection.  It turns out that in certain industries, 
such as retail, amusement, and entertainment, wages may increase in the presence of a 
                                                          
3
 Coates, Dennis. "Stadiums and Arenas: Economic Development or Economic 
Redistribution." Contemporary Economic Policy 25 (2007): 565-577. Print. 
4
 Baade, Robert, and Allen Sanderson. "The Employment Effect of of Teams and Sports Facilities." Sports, 
Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impacts of Sports Teams and Stadiums(1997): n. pag. Print. 
5
 Baade, Robert , and Richard Dye. "The Impact of Professional Sports on Metropolitan Area 
Development." Growth and Change 21 (1990): 1-14. Print. 
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new sports facility while in other industries wages tend to fall. Coates and Humphries’ 
findings fall in line with most economists who believe that the substitution effect is at 
play in these situations and that within an entire geographic area the aggregate economic 
benefits are negligible: “city by city there is substantial evidence of a harmful effect from 
the sports environment on employment and earnings in those sectors of the economy that 
stadium advocates claim will be beneficiaries of sports-led development policies” (Coates 
and Humphries). 6 
According to Hamilton and Kahn (1997), even stadiums that are thought of as 
successful examples from which other franchises should model their facilities rarely 
make the city or state any profit.  One such venue is Baltimore’s Camden Yards Ballpark.  
The Oriole’s Camden Yards was opened in 1992 and is situated in downtown Baltimore.  
Hamilton and Kahn studied annual returns from the ballpark to the statewide economy 
and how much the economy suffers as a result.  Each year, Camden Yards returns 
approximately $3 million to the statewide economy of Maryland.  However, even though 
they provide such an amount to the statewide economy, the state actually loses about $9 
million per year because of ballpark related expenses.7  Although it remains true that all 
ballparks, not just the most lucrative, provide a channel for money to flow into the local 
economy, the fact remains that it is very hard for such a facility to provide positive net 
economic impact on the local area or state. 
                                                          
6
 Coates, Dennis, and Brad Humphreys. "The Effect of Professional Sports on Earnings and Employment in 
the Services and Retail Sectors in U.S. Cities." Regional Science and Urban Economics 33 (2003): 175-
198. Print. 
7
 Hamilton, Bruce, and Peter Kahn. "Baltimore's Camden Yards Ballpark." Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The 
Economic Impacts of Sports Teams and Stadiums (1997): n. pag. Print.  
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In terms of public funding, Noll and Zimbalist (1997) found that there have been 
no cases in which the government or public funding agency has any sort of reasonable 
return on investment.  In fact, it doesn’t matter how the geographic region is measured – 
city, county, or even a larger region – the results seem to remain the same:  pecuniary 
benefits are not realized by the city or citizens as a result of a new stadium.8  Other 
economists have tried to see beyond this apparent trend by employing other models such 
as the trade multiplier, but with little success and validity.  Employing models such as the 
trade multiplier is extremely difficult because they are based on assumptions and do not 
account for structural change within the local economy in the future.  When the economic 
conditions shift in the longer run, these models cease to work and therefore are somewhat 
irrelevant when it comes to the effect of new stadiums on the economy. 
 
B. The Rational for Public Funding 
 It seems clear that tangible economic benefits are insignificant when it comes to 
new stadium construction.  The argument from proponents of public funding that such 
construction will create jobs and increase per capita income will not hold forever.  
According to Eckstein and Delaney (2002), awareness of this fallacy among the residents 
will take off and will force people to think of other ways that a new stadium can benefit 
the local area. 9  Crompton (2004) agrees and suggests that “instead of investing funds in 
commissioning flawed economic impact studies, proponents of public subsidies for major 
league sports facilities would be better advised to commission studies that measure the 
                                                          
8
 Noll, Roger, and Andrew Zimbalist. "The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Facilities." Sports, jobs, 
and taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and stadiums (1997): 55-91. Print. 
9
 Eckstein, Rick, and Kevin Delaney. "New Sports Stadiums, Community Self-Esteem, and Community 
Collective Conscience." Journal of Sport and Social Issues 26 (2002): 235-236. Print. 
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psychic income which residents ascribe to a sports team or event.”10  Psychic income, 
which includes enhanced community pride, emotional involvement, and increased 
collective self-esteem, is an intangible and non-pecuniary benefit that cannot be measured 
simply and effectively with a dollar amount.  
 Schwester (2007) believes that these non-pecuniary benefits exist in the form of 
public good externalities.  In order to understand these public good externalities and see 
whether or not they justify public funds, we must ask ourselves two questions: 
1.  “To what extent do stadiums generate civic pride throughout their communities, enhance their 
city’s reputation and national identity, and offer a patrimonial benefit?” 
 
2. “Do the public good externalities of professional athletic venues justify the use of public resources 
to finance such projects?”11 
 
To answer these questions, Schwester first thinks it is important to understand what 
public good externalities are products of constructing a new stadium.  The second vital 
step when considering public funding is determining whether the positive public good 
externalities warrant public funding over other projects that may have pecuniary 
benefits.12 
 Although he argues for the existence of a substitution effect with tangible 
economic benefits, Coates shows evidence that new stadiums bring about intangible 
positive public good externalities.13  One of these benefits is consumer surplus.  This 
implies that a consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for tickets to a given sports game is 
higher than the market price for those goods. This can be noticed throughout America as 
                                                          
10 Crompton, John. "Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major 
League Sports Facilitis." Journal of Sports Management 18 (2004): 40-58. Print. 
11
 Schwester, Richard. "An Examination of the Public Good Externalities of Professional Athletic Venues: 
Justifications for Public Financing?." Public Budgeting and Finance 27 (2007): 89-109. Print. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Coates (2007) 
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professional athletic events often sell out.  Certainly there are examples in which 
franchises struggle to get fans to games; however, a new stadium with state of the art 
amenities has the ability to encourage a larger fan base to support their team each game.   
 Swindell and Rosentraub (1998) give further evidence that professional athletic 
teams and facilities provide public good benefits by taking into account civic pride and 
national identity.14  To focus on these two characteristics, they surveyed Indianapolis 
residents to understand how important the Indianapolis Colts and the Indiana Pacers are 
to the city’s national image. Their results showed that both franchises contributed greatly 
to their sense of civic pride and also gave them a large sense of identity on a national 
scale.  Specifically, 75 percent of residents felt that the city’s reputation would suffer if 
the Colts were to move cities and 81 percent felt the same way about the Pacers.  As 
Charles Euchner (1999) points out, Indianapolis was once a quiet city with no national 
reputation; now it is “widely regarded as a sports hub.”15 
 Another public good benefit that athletic venues provide is ‘existence value.’ 
According to Willis and Garrod (1998), facilities such as Wrigley Field, Fenway Park, 
and Madison Square Garden can be landmarks and offer residents value even though they 
may not utilize them.  This is known as ‘nonuse’ value and is especially common in those 
stadiums with historical value.16  However, Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2010) affirm that such 
                                                          
14
 Swindell, David , and Mark Rosentraub. "Who Benefits from the Presence of Professional Sports Teams? 
The implications for Funding of Stadiums and Arenas." Public Administration Review 57 (1998): 11-20. 
Print. 
15
 Euchner, Charles. "Tourisms and Sports: The Serious Competition for Play." The Tourist City (1999): n. 
pag. Print. 
16
 Willis, K. G., and G. D. Garrod. "Estimating the Demand for Cultural Heritage. Artifacts of Historical 
and Architectural Interest." Hume Papers on Public Policy 6 (1998): 1-17. Print. 
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nonuse value also applies to brand new stadiums.17  With the added element of grandiose 
architecture and cutting edge technology, dazzling athletic facilities give the city a “major 
league” image.  As a result, these new stadiums are offering benefits that have never 
before been considered such as increased tourist attraction.  People are excited to live in a 
place with beautiful athletic facilities that underscore the pride and unity of the 
community. 
 Unfortunately, these non-pecuniary benefits are very difficult to measure.  
Coulson and Carlino (2004) tried to set up a model whereby they compared homes in 
cities with NFL teams to similar homes in cities without such teams.  They concluded 
that, in general, homes in NFL cities are more expensive than those in non-NFL cities.18  
However, there could be a number of reasons as to why homes in one area are more 
expensive than homes in another, so critics have greatly challenged the robustness of 
their results.  Johnson, Groothuis and Whitehead (2001) also set up a method to measure 
intangible benefits and named it the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM).19  Essentially, 
they asked people about their WTP for nonmarket goods and services that may be 
brought about by the implementation of a new stadium.  In turn, they were able to 
quantify intangible benefits that are otherwise nearly impossible to measure.  This 
method is also far from perfect; it is rare that people will accurately depict their WTP for 
nonmarket goods that they have never before considered.  Furthermore, certain citywide 
benefits including civic pride are much more valuable than people understand on an 
                                                          
17
 Ahlfeldt, Gabriel, and Wolfgang Maennig. "Stadium Architecture and Urban Development from the 
Perspective of Urban Economics." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34 (2010): 629-
46. Print. 
18
 Coulson, Edward, and Gerald Carlino. "Compensating Differentials and the Social Benefits of the 
NFL." Journal of Urban Economics 56 (2004): 25-50. Print. 
19
 Johnson, Bruce, Peter Groothuis, and John Whitehead. "The Value of Public Goods Generated by a 
Major League Sports Team: The CVM Approach." Journal of Sports Economics 2 (2001): 6-21. Print. 
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individual level.  Though it is undeniable that positive public good externalities exist as a 
result of stadium construction, measuring and comparing such value with that of other 
possible projects remains a large problem for local governments.   
 
III.  Empirical Data 
 The data used in this study 
was compiled from multiple sources.  
Only franchises that have built new 
facilities or have had major 
renovations in the last 20 years are 
considered in this model.  In total, 
there are sixty franchises from the 
National Football League, Major 
League Baseball, and National 
Basketball Association that fill this 
description and have available the data 
necessary to complete this study – 
twenty-three NFL teams, twenty MLB 
teams, and seventeen NBA teams.   
The data compiled for this 
study includes measurements of team 
success right before attaining their new 
stadium, historical success, team 
Variable Name Explanation 
Years in league Number of years the franchise 
has been in existence 
Winning percentage Regular season winning 
percentage of the franchise 
Conference 
championships 
Total number of times the 
franchise has won their 
conference championship 
League 
championship 
Total number of times the 
franchise has won the league 
(Super Bowl for NFL, World 
Series for MLB, NBA Finals 
for NBA) 
Winning pct last 3 
yrs 
The winning percentage of the 
franchise in the three seasons 
preceding the new stadium 
Fan base rank Strength of fan base relative to 
other teams in the same league 
Population City population of the city 
where the stadium resides 
(presented in 100,000’s) 
Median  income The median income in the city 
where the stadium resides 
Mean income The mean income in the city 
where the stadium resides 
Median property tax Median property tax paid in the 
county where the stadium 
resides 
Years since built The number of years that have 
passed since the stadium 
opened 
Total project cost The cost to erect the new 
stadium (presented in 
$1,000,000’s) 
Team Value The franchise’s valuation 
provided from Forbes 
%public The percentage of the overall 
cost to build the new stadium 
that the public provided 
Table 2: Variable Descriptions 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
value, strength of fan base, and certain city characteristics. Table 2 provides a more 
detailed explanation of each variable used in the regression analysis. Additionally, 
summary statistics for each of the three professional sports leagues are laid out in Table 
3.    
 
National Football League (NFL) 
 
Note: Tot. proj cost is the total cost of the new facility and is in $1,000,000’s.  Team Val is team value in $1,000,000’s.  
Pop is population in 100,000’s.  All data is for NBA teams with new stadiums within the last twenty years. % Pub is the 
percentage of total cost of the stadium paid by the public. Win % is the franchise overall regular season winning 
percentage. Conf. chmp is the overall number of conference championships won by the franchise.  Lg. chmp is the 
overall number of league championships won by the franchise.  Fan base rk is the relative rank of the franchise fan 
base.  Win %, 3 years is the teams winning percentage in the three years preceding their new stadium.  Yrs in lg is the 
total number of years the team has been in existence.  Med. Income is median income in city with the stadium.  Mean 
income is the mean income in the given city.  Med prop tax is the median property tax, per capita, in each city.  Yrs 
since built is the number of years that have passed since the stadium opened.  
 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)   (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 % 
Pub 
Win 
% 
Conf. 
chmp 
Lg. 
chm
p 
Fan 
base 
rk 
Win
%, 
3yrs 
Yrs 
in lg 
Pop 
 
Med. 
income 
Mean 
income 
Med. 
prop 
tax 
Tot.  
proj 
cost 
Yrs 
since 
built 
Team 
Val 
Mea
n 
0.56 0.49 3.22 1.61 15.13 0.49 57.22 6.56 
 
49,598.04 66,666.91 2,828.39 541 10.34 1,236.56 
St. 
Dev. 
0.33 0.05 2.69 1.88 9.27 0.15 25.42 6.75 17,215.02 18,829.26 2,096.25 418 5.24 343.89 
Min. 0 0.39 0 0 1 0.29 11 0.08 26,556 37,897 1,042 121 0 840 
Max. 1 0.58 9 6 30 0.81 93 26.95 92,198 110,472 8,750 1,600 18 2,300 
n. 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Major League Baseball (MLB)        
                   
Mean 0.6
0 
0.49 8.2 3.7 14.15 0.51 80.75 11.79 
 
46,540.05 65.954.4 2,613 411 10.8 772.85 
St. 
Dev. 
0.2
7 
0.03 10.26 6.18 7.29 0.06 45.79 17.49 13,604.3 20,094.13 1,121.05 251 5.44 430.20 
Min. 0 0.46 0 0 3 0.43 15 29.69 26,556 37,879 1,042 175 1 500 
Max. 1 0.57 40 27 29 0.61 137 81.75 73,802 107,520 6,063 1,300 19 2,500 
n. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 23 23 
National Basketball Association (NBA)        
                   
Mean 0.54 0.50 3.82 3.29 15.06 0.49 45.52 12.95 
 
45,386.35 68,843.88 2,273.71 237 13.94 658.76 
St. 
Dev. 
0.42 0.07 4.48 5.24 9.07 0.16 16.28 11.37 9,076.83 14,374.96 685.04 93.2 3.49 245.92 
Min. 0 0.36 0 0 2 0.22 10 39.68 26,556 37,897 955 89 8 410 
Max. 1 0.61 18 17 29 0.73 68 37.93 64,267 99,511 3,349 420 19 1,350 
n. 23 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
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IV. Empirical Strategy 
The empirical model used for this study is an ordinary least squares (OLS) linear 
regression.  This is based on an equation that examines the relationship between the 
percentage of each stadium’s cost that was publicly funded and certain explanatory 
variables: 
yi  =  α  +  βxi  +  εi 
In this model, the dependent variable (yi) represents the percentage of the new athletic 
facility funding that was given by the public.  The explanatory variables will differ based 
on the four phases of the regression analysis. 
In phase one I solely include team value, team success statistics, and strength of 
fan base as explanatory variables in the regression with public funding.  Data on the 
teams’ valuations was acquired from Forbes.20  The team success metrics that are 
included in the data are overall franchise regular season wins/losses, franchise winning 
percentage, conference championships, league championships and years in existence.  To 
avoid perfect multicolinearity, franchise wins/losses are omitted from the regression and 
only winning percentage is used.  Each of the success metrics gives us a slightly different 
picture of how successful a team has been over the course of its existence.   They will 
provide insight into how the historical success of a franchise affects the host city’s 
willingness to expend resources on a new professional venue.  Furthermore, the number 
of years that the franchise has been in existence is included to look at a team’s longevity 
                                                          
20
 "NFL Team Values." Forbes.com. Forbes, 27 Apr. 2014. Web. 27 Apr. 2014; "MLB Team 
Values." Forbes.com. Forbes, 27 Apr. 2014. Web. 27 Apr. 2014; "NBA Team Values." Forbes.com. 
Forbes, 27 Apr. 2014. Web. 27 Apr. 2014. 
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and its impact on their success in obtaining public funding. Each of these success 
variables for the NFL, MLB, and NBA are taken from pro-football-reference.com,21 
baseball-reference.com,22 and basketball-reference.com,23 respectively.  For each of these 
variables, the data is up to date through the end of the last completed season.  For the 
NFL, data is complete through the 2013-14 season, while MLB and NBA data is 
complete through the 2012-13 seasons.  In addition to these measures of historical 
success, the model also incorporates winning percentage of the team for the three years 
prior to the opening of the new facility.  This data is compiled from the same sources as 
the other success metrics, yet may give a more accurate snapshot of the success climate 
when the decision to publicly finance was made by local government authorities.  
The other variable that is included in phase one is fan base rank. This is a rank of the 
strength of each fan base within the professional sports leagues included in this study.  
The ranks are relative to each other and are provided annually by Emory Sports 
Marketing Analytics.  The rankings are compiled using a revenue premium model of fan 
equity:  
The key idea is that we look at team box office revenues relative to team on-field success, 
market population, stadium capacity, median income and other factors.  The first step in 
our procedure involves the creation of a statistical model that predicts box office revenue 
as a function of the aforementioned variables.  We then compare actual revenues to the 
revenues predicted by the model.  Teams with relatively stronger fan support will have 
                                                          
21
 "Franchise Encyclopedias." Pro Football Reference. Sports Reference LLC, n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2014. 
22
 "Franchise Encyclopedias." Baseball Reference. Sports Reference LLC, n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2014. 
23
 "Franchise Encyclopedias." Basketball Reference. Sports Reference LLC, n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2014. 
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revenues that exceed the predicted values, and teams that under perform have relatively 
less supportive fan bases.24 
Team and stadium statistics that were used by Emory Sports Marketing Analytics were 
taken from ESPN.  Including this variable will help explain whether or not having 
supportive and loyal fans in the area plays a role in the local government’s decision to 
fully finance, partially finance, or refuse to finance the professional facility.  
 In the second phase of this study, I use city statistics such as population, median 
income, and mean income.  Each of these is taken directly from the 2010 United States 
Census Bureau.25  This data was specifically chosen in order to give a sense of the kinds 
of trends in stadium financing that stem directly from innate city characteristics.  There is 
a large range of populations between host cities and also a large distribution of average 
incomes across cities in our sample.  These are vital statistics to keep in mind since each 
host city is unique and demographics are rarely considered in this framework. 
 In addition to these city statistics I also incorporate median property tax data for 
the counties where the stadiums reside. This data takes into account each property owner 
in the county and is provided by the Tax Foundation,26 a source that gets its numbers 
from the Census Bureau as well. Although this will not fully represent regional revenue 
and local budget constraints, it will give us a sense of the monetary inflow that the certain 
counties are working with. 
 The third phase of this study will incorporate the explanatory variables from 
phase one and phase two.  The success statistics that will be included in this section are 
                                                          
24
 Lewis, Mike, and Manish Tripathi. "Best Fans." Emory Sports Marketing Analytics. Emory University, 
n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2014. 
25
 "2010 US Census." . U.S. Census Bureau , n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2014. 
26
 Kasprak, Nicholas. "Property Tax Data by County." . Tax Foundation, n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2014. 
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historical winning percentage, recent winning percentage, total conference 
championships and total league championships.  Additionally, team value, fan base rank, 
population, mean income, and median income are used.  This phase of the study should 
provide a deeper understanding of how these variables effect public funding in the 
presence of other types of variables.  
In the final phase of this study, I add information about the athletic facility to the 
data already included in phase 3 to see even deeper into how these factors affect public 
funding.  The facility information includes the original cost of the stadium and the 
number of years since it originally opened.  Also included in the original data were 
percentages of public and private funding, yet since percentage of public funding is the 
dependent variable in each phase, neither will be used as explanatory variables in the 
regression analysis.  The funding information for each stadium, ballpark, and arena was 
taken from Stadiums of Pro Football,27 Ballparks of Baseball,28 and 
basketball.ballparks.com29 respectively.  As previously stated, stadiums built or 
renovated prior to 1994 were not taken into account in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 "Stadiums." . N.p., 27 Apr. 2014. Web. . <http://www.stadiumsofprofootball.com/>. 
28
 "Stadiums." . N.p., 27 Apr. 2014. Web. . <http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/>. 
29
 Munsey, Paul, and Cory Suppes. "Arenas." Ballparks.com. N.p., 27 Apr. 2014. Web. . 
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V. Empirical Results 
 The regression results for all four phases of the OLS regression can be found in 
Table 4.  Table 4 also shows the heterskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
A. Phase 1 
In phase one, only success and team-specific statistics are included in the 
regression.  Interestingly, regular season winning percentage, conference championships, 
and winning percentage in the three years prior to the opening of the new stadium do not 
correlate with public funding at any level of significance.  Furthermore, the number of 
league championships that a franchise has won in its lifetime correlates negatively with 
the percentage of overall stadium cost that is funded by the public and is statistically 
significant at the five percent level.  For every additional league championship that a 
franchise has won, public funding decreases by 0.032 of a percentage point.  This may 
point to the fact that success is far from a primary factor that governments look at when 
determining whether or not to extend some of the cost to their constituents.  Instead, it 
may be more likely for teams who have not experienced a high level of success to obtain 
public funding.  A possible reason for this is the fact that local authorities may want their 
losing teams to win in order to increase civic pride.  A new stadium could spur increased 
fan support, player confidence, and ultimately team success. 
 
Another telling result from regression one is team value’s negative correlation 
with percentage of public funding.  This is sensible because as a team’s value increases, 
they will have more resources at their disposal and can more easily privately fund the 
erection of a new stadium.  Although this coefficient is insignificant at all relevant levels,  
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Table 4: Regression Results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES %public %public %public %public 
     
Team value -0.000147  -2.42e-05 -6.14e-06 
 (9.13e-05)  (9.65e-05) (0.000117) 
Winning percentage 0.381  -0.115 0.304 
 (1.286)  (1.250) (1.254) 
Conference championships 0.0143  0.0162 0.0154 
 (0.0133)  (0.0146) (0.0159) 
League championships -0.0318**  -0.0258* -0.0284** 
 (0.0145)  (0.0133) (0.0132) 
Years in league -0.00239  -0.00320** -0.00330** 
 (0.00144)  (0.00159) (0.00153) 
Winning pct last 3yrs 0.262  0.422 0.288 
 (0.506)  (0.449) (0.497) 
Fan base rank 0.00870  0.00653 0.00478 
 (0.00593)  (0.00506) (0.00568) 
Population  -0.00691*** -0.00438 -0.00294 
  (0.00233) (0.00488) (0.00489) 
Median income  -8.93e-06 -3.66e-06 -2.87e-06 
  (5.87e-06) (6.40e-06) (6.16e-06) 
Mean income  2.21e-06 -2.35e-06 -3.29e-06 
  (5.14e-06) (5.34e-06) (4.71e-06) 
Median property tax  -6.36e-05*** -5.87e-05*** -4.85e-05 
  (2.22e-05) (2.06e-05) (3.67e-05) 
Total project cost    -0.000259 
    (0.000204) 
Years since built    -0.0198* 
    (0.0113) 
Constant 0.416 1.076*** 1.053* 1.257** 
 (0.593) (0.145) (0.557) (0.564) 
     
Observations 60 60 60 60 
R-squared 0.247 0.289 0.422 0.461 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Note: Tot. project cost is in $1,000,000’s.  Team Value is in $1,000,000’s.  Population is in 100,000’s 
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it is important to control for this factor because teams that have been around for a long 
time tend to have higher valuations than newer franchises. 
Regression one also shows that the number of years that a team has been in 
existence does not correlate with public funding with any statistical significance.  This 
may not be surprising since the teams that have been around a long time, in addition to 
having higher valuations, often have stadiums that are architectural landmarks for their 
city.  For example, the Chicago Cubs’ Wrigley Field, the Green Bay Packers’ Lambeau 
Field, and the New York Knickerbockers’ Madison Square Garden are examples from all 
three of the sports in this study of facilities that provide substantial historical significance 
to their cities.  Teams who play in such stadiums tend to be older franchises with fans that 
enjoy the historic venue and governments who see no reason to pay for another.  
 
B. Phase 2 
Phase two includes a different set of variables with the same dependent variable: 
public funding percentage.  Population and median property tax per property owner, two 
of the four explanatory variables examined in this regression, correlate with public 
funding with statistical significance at the one percent confidence level.  For every 
increase in population by one hundred thousand people, public funding decreases by 
0.007 of a percentage point.  While this is statistically significant, each incremental 
increase affects public funding an imperceptible amount.  Of course, the population 
statistic is very broad as it refers to the total population in an entire city.  Perhaps a more 
specific number based on the immediate area surrounding the new stadiums would 
provide a better picture of how population influences the decision to publicly fund.   
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 Median income and mean income are also negligible in how they affect public 
funding, and neither of these variables is statistically significant.  Similarly to population, 
these metrics are measures across the entire city.  Perhaps the decisions authorities make 
when determining whether to fund a new facility depends on a smaller sub-area within 
the city.  Naturally, benefits of a new venue extend beyond city limits and into 
surrounding areas, yet motives for policy makers to provide public funding may depend 
solely on a certain part of town.  For example, a common explanation for targeting a 
specific area is to improve quality of life in that area.  If local governments are keeping 
these considerations above all others, the regression results in this case make sense. 
 The final variable included in phase 2 is median property tax.  This variable is per 
property owner and gives us some insight into how much tax revenue the host city 
obtains via property tax.  Interestingly, when included only with other city statistics, 
median property tax correlates negatively with public funding.  For every increase in 
median property tax of one dollar, public funding decreases by 0.00006 of a percentage 
point.  This does not seem like a large amount, but it implies that if each property 
owner’s taxes in a given city increased by one hundred dollars, public funding decreases 
by 0.006 of a percentage point.   
 These city statistics, taken purely on their own with respect to public funding, 
paint us a fascinating picture: local authorities do not base funding decisions off city 
characteristics yet instead focus on smaller, perhaps more fragile pockets within the city 
that they hope to revive.  
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C. Phase 3 
Phase three comprises each of the variables that were used in phases one and two.  
In the presence of the other set of variables, there were some changes in coefficients and 
significance levels. 
 Although the coefficients for winning percentage, conference championships, and 
winning percentage in the three years prior to the opening of the new stadium changed 
slightly, they still do not explain public funding with any statistical significance. 
However, league championships maintain a negative correlation with public funding with 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level.  This regression shows that for every 
additional league championship public funding decreases by 0.026 of a percentage point.  
These findings further verify the intuitions provided by regression one that success of a 
team does not play a role in public funding for a new stadium.  In fact, teams who have 
not done well are more likely to receive public funding as local governments may want to 
rejuvenate their cities through increased communion and excitement as a result of a state-
of-the-art professional athletic venue. 
 Another variable that furthers the verification of phase one results is the number 
of years that the team has been in existence.  In this regression, this characteristic has 
statistical significance at the 5 percent level and indicates that for every additional year a 
team has been in the league, public funding decreases by 0.003 percentage points.  In 
cities where a certain team has been around for a long time, it is more likely for the 
stadium to exhibit ‘existence value.’ This means that the stadium itself provides a benefit 
to residents of the city either because it is architecturally magnificent or historically 
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valuable.  Teams that have been around for a longer time are more likely to have 
stadiums with historic significance.  
 In terms of city statistics, the extra variables do not affect the results much.  The 
most noticeable shift was in population, which has no statistical significance in this 
regression.  However, although it was statistically significant at the one percent 
confidence level in regression two, it did not explain much and therefore still means very 
little.  Similarly, median and mean incomes continue to lack statistical significance at all 
relevant levels.  Furthermore, while there were no dramatic shifts in significance level of 
median property tax, the coefficient value regressed towards zero.  These results allude 
even further to the fact that broad city characteristics do not explain why in certain cities 
franchises have an easier time obtaining public funding than in others.  
 
D. Phase 4 
Phase four of this study built upon phase three and added two variables that are 
specific to the new professional athletic venue: total project cost and the number of years 
since the stadium opened.  The inclusion of these variables adds a new element to the 
model and changes how significant some of the other variables are in terms of their 
explanation of public funding.   
 First, the negative correlation between league championships and public funding 
strengthened after including these variables. With statistical significance at the five 
percent confidence level, for every additional league championship that a franchise wins, 
public funding decreases by 0.028 of a percentage point.  Additionally, these results help 
confirm the fact that teams that have been around for a long time receive less public 
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funding because of the possible ‘existence value’ on their current stadium.  This final 
regression strengthens the claim that both increased success and a team’s longevity 
negatively affect public funding of a stadium. 
 Another interesting consequence of including these variables is the loss of 
statistical significance for median property tax.  This makes sense given the fact that this 
data was from the entire county and the results have been pointing to localized focus on 
the part of the decision-makers.  In phase four, city statistics are not significant at any 
relevant level and therefore can be considered inconsequential when it comes to 
determining public funding. 
 Although the total project cost does not provide us any insight into the 
determinants of public funding, the number of years since the stadium was built does.  
For each additional year that has passed since the new stadium opened for a professional 
sports franchise, public funding decreases by 0.02 percentage points.  This variable is 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level and indicates that in recent years franchises 
have been more successful in obtaining a higher percentage of public funding.  Of course, 
the coefficient is not overwhelming, yet this phenomenon is interesting and should be 
considered in future research.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 This study is an empirical analysis of why certain cities tend to offer public 
funding for the construction of new professional athletic facilities. It is well known 
among economists in the field that the erection of a new facility does not spur economic 
activity; it neither causes increases in local spending nor raises per capita income.  Of 
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course, certain industries and small areas benefit from the implementation of such a 
venue, yet those benefits are more than offset by other industries and larger areas who 
suffer as a result.  Nevertheless, it remains true that new stadiums are being built at a 
faster rate than ever before.  It turns out that the majority of the benefits that come about 
as a result of a new stadium are non-pecuniary benefits such as public good externalities.  
These include civic pride, national identity, existence value, and a sense of a ‘major 
league’ image among many more.  The fact that these benefits are unquantifiable in 
nature makes it tough for local government agencies to justify spending millions to fund a 
stadium; it is very difficult to judge whether or not the net benefit is greater than that of 
another possible project.  In this analysis, I employ an ordinary least squares regression 
model to uncover trends in cities that decide to finance a large part of a new professional 
athletic venue.  
 The results show that great success among sports franchises does not explain why 
certain teams are able to attain public funding for their new facility.  In fact, teams that 
have done worse generally get a higher percentage of public funding than the more 
successful team.  This may possibly be the case because erecting an inspiring new 
stadium in an area with a losing team will generate a much larger increase in non-
pecuniary benefits than it would in an area with a winning team.  Winning areas are 
already full of civic pride, national identity, and other forms of psychic income, and 
therefore they do not have as much to gain from a new stadium as areas with 
unsuccessful teams.  For this reason, policy-makers in areas with winning teams may 
tend to opt for another project as opposed to spending a great deal of money on a new 
stadium.   
Holland 30 
 
 In terms of city statistics, the results shed light on the fact that citywide 
characteristics do not play a large role as determinants of public funding.  These results 
are very telling; when policy-makers examine a city’s need for a new stadium, they are 
primarily focused on the geographic area immediately surrounding the new facility.  
Though many others experience a degree of psychic income, those who live in the 
immediate area experience the most.  In future studies, data with demographic 
information in the smaller area around the stadium would potentially be more useful.  
Also, including specific city and county revenue and spending information would paint a 
more complete picture of the budgetary considerations that policy-makers encounter 
when making these decisions.  
 Finally, the results point to the fact that recent stadiums have had a higher 
percentage of public funding than older ones.  Although this is by a relatively small 
margin, it remains absolutely true that stadiums are being built and will continue to be 
built at a faster rate than ever before.  New technology has enabled more efficient 
building strategies while allowing still allowing for grandiose architecture and even more 
immersive fan experiences.   In the future, stadiums will become more elaborate and 
cutting-edge, and franchises will feel inadequate if theirs does not match up.  Of course, 
these facilities need to be funded and policy makers will continue to be forced into 
making these difficult funding decisions at involving public money. 
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